- 5 Objections
- Response to 5 Objections
- The Historical Case for the Resurrection of Jesus
- 3 Points of Departure
- On Christian Origins
- On the Holy Spirit
- On Belief
- The Trouble with (Traditional) Worldviews
- Imagination, Authority, and Knowledge
- On Marxism
- Christianity and Marxism
- In Defense of Skepticism
- Skepticism and Ethics
- Where I’m Coming From
- Tradition, Knowledge, and Metaphysics
Taking Stock
Over the last few posts, I feel there are a few different avenues we’ve opened up worth continuing to explore. There’s the issue of Marxist historical theory and methodology, the merits or downfalls of such a theory, and possible further clarifications on it.
Then, there’s the broader question of epistemology – agnosticism, skepticism, coherence, coherentism, authority both divine and human, and all issues pertaining to the interpretation of available evidence.
Then, there’s the application of these things to our subject itself – Christianity, and, more specifically, the early history of Christianity.
I don’t want to avoid any of these avenues,1I’m intending to revisit and clarify my thoughts on marxism as well as the challenge you’ve raised concerning the truth of orthodoxy in due course. but I’m thinking it might be best to first step back a bit and continue discussing what’s most basic (at least in one sense), which in this case I think is the question of epistemology. To that end, I’d like to address a couple points you’ve raised about agnosticism and/or skepticism.
Concerning Epistemology
In “Imagination, Authority, and Knowledge” you share a quote from Philip Brooks, in which he seems to suggest that it is better or healthier to believe something that might not be entirely true than to not believe it for fear of believing something partly false.2“Imagination, Authority, and Knowledge” in the first section, on “Epistemology.” Here is the full quote for easy reference: “To believe is to live. Skepticism as a habit, as a condition, is a sign of deficient vitality. It is a vastly nobler fear which dreads lest it should lose some truth than that which trembles lest it should believe something which is not wholly true.” You then go on to suggest that “much more evil in human history has been caused by people lacking conviction . . . than by the small number of people who have been deeply committed to evil causes.”3Ibid. I would object strongly to both of these suggestions, and in what follows, I try and explain why, in so-doing provide something of a defense of skepticism and agnosticism, and raise a few questions to hopefully help clarify this issue.
Is Belief Healthier than Skepticism?
In answer to the claim that it is healthier to believe than to be skeptical (of things in general, as I take it), I would first of all argue that it matters hugely what proposition is under consideration and what is at stake in it. In other words, I think we ought to consider each case on it’s own terms and in its own context. There are obviously many propositions that hold very low stakes either way (i.e. there’s not much risk to believing or disbelieving them).4Probably most beliefs we hold are of this sort. It matters little, for example, if I believe or disbelieve it is raining just before I step outside. Others hold very low stakes one way but not the other.5As I understand it, this is basically the argument behind Pascal’s Wager, that there is probably little to be lost by believing in the Gospel and following Christianity, but there is very much to be gained should it turn out to be true. So, we may as well believe it. Still others might hold high stakes both ways.6Maybe all of this is obvious. I recognize that, reading it out of context, it is entirely possible I am misinterpreting Brooks’ statement, and he really means something more nuanced and specific than that belief in general is healthier or better than skepticism in general. If this is the case, please feel free to chalk my first argument up to a misunderstanding. However, whatever Brooks’ intended meaning, I think my subsequent arguments will be at least somewhat relevant and should stand on their own terms.
Since in this series we’re dealing with some propositions that have significant implications for how we might go about living our lives or what might happen to us at death,7See my first post, “5 Objections.” I would say we’re dealing with some pretty high stakes indeed. However, it’s worth pointing out that the matter of just how high the stakes are attached to some of these propositions is one of the things under debate and, in my view, not always very clearly discernible.
We can get more into that later perhaps. For now, I’ll just make one other key point related to high-stakes propositions. I agree it’s important to make an effort to move past agnosticism when dealing with a question with high stakes.8as you suggest in “On Christian Origins” in the first section on “Belief.” However, this effort will not always necessarily lead one to actually succeed in moving past agnosticism – nor should it. Rather, an agnostic position is sometimes the end result of this effort, of taking a question seriously enough to investigate it thoroughly and consider as many perspectives as possible. This is not a lack of vitality. This is the very exercise of vitality – free-thinking, discernment, diligence, self-awareness, sympathy – these are the skills and values of a good skeptic, as I see it.
Are there bad skeptics? Certainly; there are of course people who are skeptical of something without recognizing the values just listed or without holding to them consistently or with fidelity. There are also bad believers – people who believe things without evidence or consistency or without properly weighing evidence or even recognizing that such a thing might be necessary. The point, of course, whether we tend toward belief or skepticism, is to seek after the truth. Neither tendency should become an end in itself.
Secondly, I would point out that considering propositions in their full contexts means taking into consideration any and all credible counter-propositions. Most open questions in life are open precisely because there are multiple theories or propositions that hold comparable levels of explanatory power and/or are backed up by comparable levels of evidence. This matters because it’s almost never a simple question of whether someone is a believer or not, but what they are choosing to believe. This is certainly the case with respect to most of the propositions presently under consideration. (Were it not, I don’t know that I would bother making any objections to mainstream Christian claims. After all, what alternative would there be?).
This leads to a third argument I would raise against this claim, that from my perspective – and I believe both traditional wisdom and the historical record will back me up here – habitual belief is probably just as likely, if not more likely, than habitual skepticism to lead to folly. Someone who goes through life believing everything they’re told – or, worse, everything they tell themselves – will no doubt encounter much disappointment along the way. I acknowledge there should be something of a balance and that it is important to believe in something in order to avoid paralysis or despair, but if we are truly seeking balance, I think the answer for most of us lies not in being more trusting, enthusiastic, or hopeful, but in being more discerning, humble, and yes, more skeptical.
Why do I say this?
Because we live in a culture that is generally highly enthusiastic and optimistic about its beliefs and seems very uninterested in submitting those beliefs to serious question. Just consider how often we encourage people to dream big, follow their dreams, believe in themselves, follow their hearts, live life to the fullest, not let anyone hold them back, be true to themselves, live their truth, etc.. Or, consider how difficult it is for most of us to discuss politics, religion, or really any other topic of importance constructively. As individuals and as a society, we don’t need more enthusiasm, we need more discernment, more humility, and more caution – in a word, more wisdom. In our context, I believe that looks like a healthy dose of skepticism. If I adopt skepticism as a habit or a “condition,” that is one reason why.
So much for the question of health or vitality. On to the second claim – that more evil has been caused throughout history by a lack of conviction than by strong conviction.
Does Skepticism Lead to Evil?
In answer to this, I would first of all ask on what you would base that assessment. What evidence are you thinking of when you make this claim? Are there particular examples throughout human history or general principles you can point to to help explain where you’re coming from? How would you suggest we could even go about measuring the amount of evil caused by these different groups?
I ask because I think a strong case could be made that this is the other way around, but also because I think there are some innate problems with trying to measure this sort of thing. Besides the mind-boggling issue of how one measures evil or badness, there’s the question of what we consider good or evil in the first place, a question about which humanity is far from reaching a general consensus.
Secondly, I would object to the implication that a position of skepticism or agnosticism with respect to some or even many propositions necessarily or even typically entails or leads to a lack of conviction regarding moral/ethical judgments or principles. And, certainly, being agnostic about metaphysics does not preclude someone from acting on moral/ethical principles, even if they might lack a clear metaphysical foundation for those principles. Many people hold to principles that don’t necessarily rest on a particular metaphysical belief or set of beliefs,9Utilitarian ethics, for example, have been and are still held by people of various religious and philosophical persuasions, partly because they rest on principles that can cut across those lines. and even though metaphysics often do come to bear on ethics, one can act on ethical principles without being certain about their metaphysical foundations. In short, I believe one can be skeptical and still be ethical.10This brings up what I think is an interesting side-note concerning the connection between religion and morality. There is a popular belief (usually among certain types of religious people, including Christians) that religion provides a necessary foundation for morality. Sometimes this is accompanied by the converse assertion that people without religion have a lack of morals or lack of firm moral convictions. However, studies I’ve come across in the anthropology and psychology of religion that investigate this connection often show this is largely false. People and groups adopt and change morals over time based on all sorts of factors, and in the real world there’s no necessity or inevitability to those morals having a coherent rational or transcendent metaphysical foundation. It’s much more accurate to say that religion sometimes makes morality more intelligible (for those with an interest in making it so). I could point you to a couple resources on this if you’re interested, but I believe for that last distinction I’m indebted to Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New York: Basic Books, 2001). This also related to what I was getting at in one of my footnotes concerning the idea that we must have a worldview in order to function in life, “The Trouble with (Traditional) Worldviews” footnote 2.
Furthermore, I would submit that a position of habitual skepticism is itself an act of conviction, or is at least closely related to certain ethical convictions. Specifically, a posture of habitual skepticism often does entail an ethic according to which it is good and responsible to question authorities, authorities ought to stand up to scrutiny in order to be trusted, and free thought is considered valuable and virtuous. Beyond this, I would make the case that habitual skepticism also often goes hand-in-hand with ethical virtues such as humility, empathy, sympathy, honesty, and candor, as well as principles such as giving others the benefit of the doubt, avoiding prejudice, and considering truth and truthfulness to be highly valuable, even at great cost.
Finally, I must add that to suggest it is better to follow good and avoid evil even at the cost of some truth is to sidestep an important point – that exactly what constitutes good and evil (or even whether such categories exist in any real sense) is one of the key truths worth questioning in the first place.
I’d better stop there. As I say above, I think a case could be made that strong conviction has caused more evil throughout human history than a lack of conviction, but I’ll wait to see what you think of all this rather than try and add that here now.
A quick comment on my own words for clarification:
In case it’s not clear why any of this matters to me or why it would be important enough to warrant its own post, I should point out that the issue of epistemology has come up time and again as a key point of disagreement in conversations I’ve had over religious claims (including this one). It matters because it sometimes ends up making all the difference to whether someone believes something or not. Unfortunately, it sometimes becomes a conversation stopper, but I believe it can and should be a conversation starter. That’s one of my aims here. While in this post I am on the defensive with regard to my epistemological position, defending it against a couple negative arguments I think are not well-founded, I also happen to believe there are good positive reasons for the epistemological position I hold. Some of them can be seen in things I’ve written here, but there is much more that could be said.
1. The other part of Pascal’s wager is that if Christianity turns out to be true, and you don’t believe, you have very much to
lose indeed.
2. One of the difficulties in epistemology is the tremendous
load we place on the human mind to see things clearly.
Inspite of obvious mental deficiencies, we feel we are able to
make clear judgements.