In the last post, I attempted to provide something of a defense of both agnosticism and skepticism (as I understand those terms). My goal in this post will be to respond to your last rebuttal, and at the same time provide a more positive case for why I think agnosticism and skepticism are good approaches to discerning truth and to life in general. In other words, I want to explain a bit of my perspective – where I’m coming from as I approach these issues.

Where We Are

First things first. It has been very helpful to me to clarify some of the terminology and eliminate some of the semantic differences we’ve had in first approaching this topic, and it seems to me there is actually much on which we agree.¹See the string of comments on “Skepticism and Ethics.” As I see it, we are already in agreement concerning the following ideas:

1. That belief and disbelief function (or at least can be thought of as functioning) along a spectrum, and that one can believe or disbelieve something with greater or lesser degrees of certainty, ranging anywhere from near certainty that it is true to near certainty that it is false.
2. That, strictly speaking, absolute knowledge, or 100% certainty, about any proposition is impossible (or almost impossible) for humans, given the limits of our minds and faculties.
3. That it is responsible and healthy to have something of a balance between skepticism (i.e. the tendency to not believe) and trust (i.e. the tendency to believe).
4. That, between the two of us, I generally tend further toward skepticism, and you generally tend further toward trust.

Where then is the disagreement?

I think you are right to say that a key disagreement we have is about where exactly the healthy balance lies between skepticism and trust. My goal here is to convince you, even if just a little more than previously, of the merits of skepticism. So, here goes nothing . . .

Why Skepticism?

In the banner of this blog, there are images of two men. I did not choose them by accident; they are two of my intellectual and ethical heroes, and they serve as inspiration for many of the topics and ideas covered in All Things Matter. No doubt they were not perfect people by any means; none of us are. But, they have certainly become legendary throughout the world for some of their philosophical ideas and ethical principles, and I do not think it is at all a stretch to say that they are two of the most influential people in all of human history. Perhaps I can do no better, then, in mounting a case for the ethical and intellectual reasonableness of my position, than to appeal to their example.

Socrates

Socrates²I’d like to acknowledge from the get-go that there are difficulties with parsing the views and actions of the historical Socrates from the views of Plato, from whom we have much of our knowledge of Socrates’s philosophy. While it doesn’t matter hugely for my purposes here whether I’m following the views of the historical Socrates so much as the tradition for which he was responsible, my understanding is that the early dialogues of Plato likely reflect much more closely the views of Socrates himself. I believe the ideas I describe here can be evidenced in these early dialogues and therefore can reasonably be attributed to Socrates himself. is often called the father of western philosophy, and I think he deserves the title. While the Greek philosophical tradition was alive and quite active prior to Socrates, he gave that tradition a methodology and a set of principles on which it could continue systematically rather than in the more speculative or, perhaps, disorganized manner it had previously.³None of this is to say presocratic Greek philosophy is without its merits. I think there is much value in what we still have from that place and time, and it is doubtful to me that Socrates would have developed his thoughts in the way he did without being influenced by that ongoing tradition.

Methodologically, what Socrates used and advocated is conversation, specifically dialogue, and even more specifically what we call the Socratic Method – teasing apart assumptions and theories through questioning in order to test their reasonableness, applicability, and their foundations. Crucially, this methodology is not merely outwardly focused, but it both begins and ends with introspection. So, we see also in Socrates an emphasis on self-awareness, on being acutely aware of one’s own ignorance and lack of wisdom, and this simply as a natural consequence of the same principles being carried out consistently with oneself as with others.

In response to something like the Socratic Method, one might well ask (and I’ve come across a number of people who do ask) “Why? What’s the point of questioning everything? At some point, don’t you have to believe something?”

The point, I think, for Socrates is truth. An important idea here is that, while we might be able to discover truths about the world, ourselves, and others through all sorts of avenues and methods (e.g. dreams, visions, prophecy, astrology, intuition, emotions, majority consensus, tradition, myth, divination, meditation, mathematics, logic, science, or just plain guesswork), if those things really are truths – objective truths as you might call them – they should stand up to all scrutiny and examination. If, on the other hand, upon examination they fall short of being adequately reasonable, objective, or well-founded, this may at least be revealed through the process of inquiry. We thus get closer to objective truth (or at least closer to understanding our own ignorance) by examining our theories – or, often, our assumptions – to find out to what extent we can be confident they are objectively true.

Socrates and Skepticism

So, I like Socrates. I think he’s on to something. But, what does it have to do with skepticism?

The answer to this one’s pretty straightforward. If we take “skepticism” to be simply the entertaining of doubts, the whole methodology I just described – the Socratic Method, discerning truths and falsehoods through questioning, self-awareness and self-criticism – is basically skepticism practiced conscientiously and with consistency, thoroughness, and rigor. Where there is room for doubt, Socrates bids us pursue those doubts, even if it means us undermining “truths” we hold very dear – even if it means us becoming more confused and disoriented about some of life’s most important questions.

Socrates and Ethics

And, here again, one might well ask, “Why? If the point of all this is to pursue truth, but we often end up becoming less sure of things and more aware of our own ignorance through this process, at some point, aren’t we better off just choosing to believe in something?”

I can’t be sure how Socrates would answer, but we can get a hint of where he might have fallen on this issue from those clues we do have about his life and philosophy.

First of all, it doesn’t seem to be the case that Socrates himself intended to question every truth out there or that he ever advocated such a thing. Rather, he seems to have been preoccupied with investigating some fairly significant key issues. The questions he pursued were things like “What is virtue?,”⁴See, for example, Meno. There are many translations available of Plato’s dialogues, including full texts available online. The anthology I consulted in writing this post is Classics of Western Philosophy, 7^th Edition, ed. Steven M. Cahn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2006). “What is piety?,”⁵See, for example, Euthyphro. “What is justice?,”⁶See, for example, Republic, although I’ve come across the contention that “justice” is a somewhat misleading translation of the Greek word at the heart of Republic, and it may more accurately be translated as “morality.” See Robin Waterfield, introduction to Plato, Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2008), xii. “How can we know ourselves?,” “How can we achieve the good life?,”⁷These two are referenced explicitly or implicitly in several dialogues. “What should be our attitude toward death?,”⁸See, for example, the discussions of death in Apology, 39-42. “How should we raise our children?,”⁹See, for example, Apology, especially beginning at 24. One of the crimes of which Socrates was apparently accused was “corrupting the young.” etc..

I’d like to point out two things about these questions. First, they are all quite practical, in the sense that they are concerned with human practices – actions and attitudes toward everyday life and society. They are, in other words, concerned with what we might call ethics. Second, they are all very basic, or fundamental, to the practical concerns they address, focusing on general principles or features of reality that inform more specific issues or situations that might arise in life. They are, in other words, concerned with what you might call worldview or metaphysics.

To summarize, this means that the kinds of questions with which Socrates seems to have been concerned had to do mostly with ethics and with the metaphysical or fundamental grounding of ethical principles.

But, why these kinds of questions?

Here, I am forced to speculate somewhat, but I think it’s a safe bet to assume that at least one reason these questions were important to Socrates is the simple fact that they are relevant to the lives of most people. As you point out, in order to function in life, we must deal, at least implicitly, with the question of how best to live.¹⁰“On Belief,” paragraph 4.

Beyond the face-value relevance of all ethical questions, I think there’s also a case to be made that Socrates pursued certain kinds of ethical questions because they tend to be high-stakes questions. To be sure, there can be ethical conundrums that are very relevant to everyday life but basically don’t seem to matter all that much in the grand scheme of things.¹¹For example, should I pay a dollar more for the carton of cage-free eggs at the store, or save that money in the interest of being frugal? Perhaps the ethical considerations involved in such decisions are cumulatively important, but the stakes hinging on that one carton of eggs are likely not that high. Defining general principles like “justice” and “virtue” matters – as Socrates shows in his dialogues – because these principles can inform extremely high-stakes decisions, up to and including matters of life and death.

As an illustration, take for instance Euthyphro, which centers around the question, “What is piety?” In this dialogue, Socrates is conversing with Euthyphro, who is on his way to prosecute his own father for what we in our day might call gross negligence or manslaughter.¹²The situation is a bit complicated. After learning that one of his servants had killed one of his slaves in drunken anger, Euthyphro’s father bound the servant and left him in a ditch. While Euthyphro’s father inquired what should be done next, the servant died of exposure. See Euthyphro, 4.C-4.E. Part of the point, I think, is to have a sufficiently complicated situation to serve as an impetus to the ethical quandary that follows in the dialogue. This specific situation is the starting point for Socrates asking Euthyphro to explain the general principle of piety. So, we see in this case that a man’s freedom and potentially his life are at stake, not to mention his relationship with his son. Euthyphro is certain he is doing the pious thing despite the fact that he is going against many other opinions to the contrary. As I read this, by drawing Euthyphro’s ideas into question, Socrates is implicitly advocating a position of caution and humility with respect to both beliefs and actions. Since, as he shows by the end of the dialogue, Euthyphro doesn’t really have a well-founded account of what constitutes piety in the first place, he perhaps ought not be quite so quick to prosecute others in its name.

I would suggest that the Euthyphro typifies the Socratic approach to ethics. For Socrates, it is precisely because ethical principles are so relevant to everyday life and society and because their stakes can be so high that we should make every effort to subject those principles to critical examination, lest in our haste and desire for certainty, despite our best intentions, we mistake a falsehood for a truth and so cause great harm.

Bearing these things in mind, let us turn to the second of our two philosophers.

Confucius

About a generation or two before Socrates was living and teaching in the Greek peninsula, Confucius¹³Again, as with Socrates, there is some difficulty in parsing the views of the historical Confucius from those attributed to him or added by his followers later. In this case, I take the Analects, the main text attributed to Confucius, as the best source we have for getting close to the views of Confucius himself. At the least, the Analects are certainly the best source for early Confucian tradition, and it is that tradition which I am most influenced by and which I attempt to describe here. There are many English translations of the Analects available. For its helpful commentary, I would highly recommend Confucius, Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries, trans. Edward Slingerland (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003). was living and teaching on the other side of the world near the center of what would become the nation of China. The parallels between the two men are striking. Like Socrates, Confucius (as far as we know) never wrote down a word of his own philosophy. Like Socrates, Confucius was very concerned with ethics. And, like Socrates (but perhaps even more so) Confucius advocated a position of personal humility, honesty and straightforwardness in word and deed, and individual responsibility toward the public good.

Confucius lived during a period of relative political turmoil leading up to the Warring States period in ancient Chinese history, which historians date as beginning about 75 years after his death. Consequently, like many Chinese philosophers of his day, a primary concern that comes across in Confucius’s philosophy is how best to counteract the forces of entropy and establish and maintain a stable, harmonious society.¹⁴For this information on historical context, I consulted Edward Slingerland, “Introduction” and “Traditional Chronology” in Confucius: Analects (2003).

So, how to do this?

At risk of being grossly over-simplistic, I would suggest that for Confucius, the answer hinges on one word – “virtue.” Confucius seems to have identified the root problem of society as a severe and collective lack of moral character, and he therefore prescribes a reintroduction of virtue at all levels. Exactly what sorts of attitudes and behaviors constitute Confucian virtue is a large and complicated question,¹⁵And, it is a question no doubt debated among many Confucians through the years. but they follow such essential principles as compassion, service – especially to elders and family members – and proper ritual observance.

As for how to reintroduce such virtues in society, Confucius placed great emphasis on the role of rulers and government officials, considering them to be moral exemplars and key propogators of virtue among the people. He also emphasized ritual as a primary means by which people cultivate virtuous habits of both body and mind. A key idea here is that (contrary to what some philosophers of Confucius’s time were saying) people will eventually follow a virtuous ruler willingly as long as they are trained through proper and sincere ritual and are led by example rather than coercion or deception.¹⁶See Analects 2.3.

Confucius and Skepticism (and Ethics)

It would be quite a stretch for me to suggest that Confucius was a skeptic to anything like the extent we see in Socrates. There is much more that Confucius believes in or takes on faith, and there is not the same emphasis on critical examination and questioning we find with Socrates. In fact, from one perspective, all of Confucian philosophy is underpinned and driven by faith, the faith that Confucius holds in the power of virtue to uplift and restore individuals and society. If in Socrates we have a quintessential social critic, in Confucius we have a quintessential social reformer, someone with both an awareness of what might be truly wrong with society and strong beliefs about how to actually go about fixing it.

So, what does this have to do with skepticism?

Here, I would argue that while Confucius’s philosophy is underpinned and driven by belief, it is put in balance by a crucial, if subtle, element of self-awareness and self-criticism – that is, self doubt. As with the socratic method, Confucius takes it as a starting point that we are all limited intellectually and morally; we lack wisdom and understanding. We therefore all have much to learn, and Confucius urges us toward continuous education and self-cultivation. What keeps Confucius from following Socrates toward a stripping down of ethical principles to their foundations is a difference in focus. Rather than focus on what we don’t know, I would suggest Confucius urges us to focus on what we can know about ethics, or at least what we can reasonably guess.

Confucian ethics are imminently this-worldly in focus and practical in nature. While there are metaphysical beliefs implicit in many of Confucius’s notions of virtue and the relationship between society and the cosmos, these are not often addressed directly, and when they are, it is not to clarify or explore the precise nature of that metaphysical or spiritual reality, but to use it as a referent and highlight its connection to the empirical and tangible reality of human lives.

The most famous example of Confucius’s abstinence from addressing the metaphysical is Analects 11.12:

“Zilu asked about serving ghosts and spirits. The Master [i.e. Confucius] said, ‘You are not yet able to serve people – how could you be able to serve ghosts and spirits?’

‘May I inquire about death?’

‘You do not yet understand life – how could you possibly understand death?’”¹⁷Analects 11.12.

I find the wisdom in this passage compelling even at face-value. The idea, clear enough, is that we can get ahead of ourselves, be focused inappropriately on metaphysical or spiritual concerns, and miss the more primary concern of how best to handle our relationships with our fellow humans here and now.¹⁸See also Analects 7.21.

So, we see that Confucius’s connection to skepticism is also his connection to ethics. He is skeptical about our ability to know much about metaphysical reality, but, more than that, he is skeptical of our need to know much about it in order to function in life. Instead, he is content to assume (like others of his time) that there is a connection between the cosmic order and our personal and societal harmony, and he urges us to focus on cultivating that harmony. This is step one. The rest may follow in due time.

Now, we’ve seen a bit of what Socrates and Confucius are about and how they approach skepticism and ethics. So, how have they informed my view of these issues, and what does it have to do with our discussion? In what follows, I attempt to answer these questions while responding to your last post.

The Practicality of Skepticism

One issue you raise in your last post has to do with the practicality of entertaining a great number of doubts about important questions. Specifically, you object to the notion that one should “consider as many perspectives as possible” and/or “consider any and all viable counter-propositions” before choosing to believe something about an open question.¹⁹“Skepticism and Ethics,” “Skepticism – to what degree?,” paragraph 3.

This seems to me to be basically the same criticism I mentioned earlier concerning the Socratic Method – that we can’t go through life questioning absolutely everything; it’s just not feasible. In following with Socrates, then, my response would be as follows:

First of all, I agree, we can’t go through life questioning absolutely everything, and I have never meant to suggest that we do.²⁰As I mentioned in “In Defense of Skepticism,” it matters hugely what sort of proposition is under consideration and what the stakes are attached to it. In bringing this up, I meant to acknowledge that not all questions should prompt us to the same level of critical examination. Some questions don’t matter as much as others, and while we don’t always know which matter most, we can make some well-informed judgments about which are worth considering more carefully. However, we can – and I believe we should – follow Socrates in spending a great deal of time and energy carefully considering answers to high-stakes ethical questions and their fundamental grounding. Not only is this entirely possible, it’s an extremely important step if we are to avoid dogmatism and sophistry, and we have an historical example of someone who apparently did this during his later years and seems to have survived just fine – that is, of course, until his execution. Furthermore, in that very execution, we have an example of someone who was able to remain skeptical about many important questions and nevertheless take an ethical stand on an important issue even to the point of death.

Finally, for anyone who has their doubts about the practicality of remaining skeptical or agnostic concerning life’s important questions, I would simply invite them to try it. I’ve been doing it for a while now, and I can assure you it is not impossible. It is often, especially at first, confusing, disorienting, uncomfortable, even scary, but it is not impossible.²¹If one of our goals is to avoid discomfort by avoiding doubts or lines of inquiry, I think you would agree, that’s a problematic position to take epistemologically.

The Relationship between Belief and Action

Another point that seems to arise implicitly in your last reply has to do with the primacy of belief over action. In the same paragraph wherein you object to the practicality of skepticism, you suggest one reason it is impractical is because being skeptical about everything would cause us to be “paralyzed with indecision,” because “we must frequently believe in things and act on them without first examining every single alternative theory,” and because “it is simply not feasible to carefully examine the possible reasons for believing every different religion on earth before deciding to adhere to one of them.”²²“Skepticism and Ethics,” “Skepticism – to what degree?,” paragraph 3, emphasis mine. What is implied here, it seems to me, is the notion that beliefs are primary, and actions depend on and follow subsequently from beliefs. I don’t believe this is always the case, or even if it is often the case, I don’t believe our beliefs need to reach the level of certainty at which they constitute what you would call knowledge before we can act on them. I’m starting to think this may be a significant point of miscommunication between us.

When I suggest that we should critically examine our own beliefs and those of others when it comes to important questions, I do not mean at all to imply that we should always subject those things to thorough critical scrutiny before making any decisions on how to act with respect to those things. Rather, I’ve been taking it as a given that one can act on a belief or theory without having total confidence that belief or theory is in fact true. In other words, I’m simply saying we can guess and act on guesses. In fact, when it comes down to it, many of the decisions we make in life are actually acts of guesswork. Hopefully, they’re acts of well-informed, educated guesswork, but guesswork none-the-less. We can make guesses, act on guesses, and continue to critically examine our best theories as we go, making changes as we learn more or change our perspective or orientation.

In essence, here, I’m following Confucius in advocating adherence to a set of ethical principles that work well to create personal and social harmony while ultimately recognizing our own ignorance about the world and continuing to learn more as we go. On another level, Confucius urges us to paricipate in ethical obligations – particularly ritual obligations – even if we don’t at first believe in or understand their purposefulness or efficacy. We don’t need to fully believe in them to follow them. In many cases, after first cultivating in ourselves habits of action, habits of mind will follow.

So, I agree it’s not that feasible for us to investigate thoroughly the possible reasons for believing every single religion out there before we choose to adhere to one. But, it is entirely feasible for us to investigate possible reasons for believing in religious traditions we come across in life or that seem particularly viable for various reasons even as we choose to adhere to one . . . or more than one . . . or none at all. In the vast majority of cases there is nothing inconsistent or unreasonable about choosing to investigate religious questions while we continue to act on the beliefs that we find most viable or likely to be true.

This leads us into another issue you have rasied and begs the question: “What makes a belief reasonable?”

Reasonable Skepticism

You have criticized some of my statements in my last post, perhaps rightly so, as being a bit puzzling or confusing – particularly as regards the question of what constitutes a reasonable belief or set of beliefs.²³“Skepticism and Ethics,” “Metaphysical Skepticism and Ethical Skepticism, ” paragraphs 1 and 2. Here is my attempt to clarify.

First of all, like yourself, I do not use the term “reason” in any very technical or strict sense. Rather, to borrow from a footnote in another post of mine concerning this issue, “by ‘reason’ I simply mean any idea that is based at least in part on evidence from the real world (that is, the world we share as a common reference) and that is concerned with describing or explaining reality (or some part of reality). Note that under this definition, almost any idea could count as a reason, but not all reasons are equal. Ideas could be thought of as more or less reasonable depending on the quality and/or quantity of evidence they take into account, and on how well that evidence is interpreted.”²⁴“The Reason for Hate,” footnote 5. Note also, I would make no sharp or clear distinction between the realm or scope of reason and those of other faculties such as intuition, emotion, logic, or experience; and, I am highly skeptical of attempts to draw such a sharp distinction. This seems to me to be largely wishful thinking.

So, what sorts of beliefs are reasonable?

Basically, I think almost any belief can be thought of as more or less reasonable depending on our level of experience and scope of knowledge. The most reasonable theories or beliefs would be those that take into account a broad and deep scope of evidence and account for it in a way that is as consistent and unproblematic as possible.

Another important thing to keep in mind is what we’ve both agreed is the case regarding knowledge – that, strictly speaking, no one (or almost no one) can have absolute knowledge, or 100% certainty, about any proposition, given the limits of our minds and faculties.²⁵See our shared idea #2 above Thus, as I’ve said before, we are all muddling through life in one sense or another;²⁶“The Trouble with (Traditional) Worldviews,” footnote 2. we are all limited in knowledge, wisdom, and experience. Therefore, none of us can claim to hold an unquestionable premise from which to base their beliefs or arguments. Rather, we must all make do with the uncertain world in which we live, developing (and arguing) beliefs as best we can. And, remember, we are in agreement here with both Socrates and Confucius.

Yet another important thing to keep in mind is the difference between believing something and arguing for something. The difference is not all that great or stark, but it matters because I fear this is one thing about which I was unclear in my last post. We may base our personal beliefs off of evidence that is not accessible to others, and we all base our personal beliefs off of at least some evidence that is not shared by the rest of the world. In arguing our beliefs to try and convince others they are true, our challenge is to develop common ground and as much shared evidence as possible.

Keeping all that in mind, let’s turn to some of the questions you raise in your last post.

Do I believe it is “perfectly acceptable for someone to have moral beliefs without having any explanation or reason for why they should think those beliefs to be true?”²⁷“Skepticism and Ethics,” “Metaphysical Skepticism and Ethical Skepticism,” paragraph 2.

No. Or, rather, it is acceptable in the sense that I accept people sometimes might have no explanation or reason for their ethical beliefs. It is not acceptable in the sense that it is good or wise for people to have no reason for their beliefs. My footnote about people often lacking rational or metaphysical bases for their ethics was meant to be a side note more than anything. I don’t mean to condone any and every ethical system regardless of its basis, but it is relevant, I think, to point out that there are may bases people make use of for their morality. Some are obviously better than others.

Do I believe it’s reasonable for someone to hold to ethics without a metaphysical basis?

Absolutely, yes. It may be very reasonable to do so, especially if one has come to believe based on critical investigation that they should remain agnostic regarding the metaphysical nature of reality. As for the idea that such ethical systems merely beg the question of a metaphysical basis for what is most good or valuable, I would say maybe they do, but just because the question is begged doesn’t mean we have reasonable access to a reliable answer to that question. So, what can we do? Here, I suggest we follow Confucius. We can develop theories. We can make educated guesses. We can use what evidence we do have to discern what might be the best ethical framework for individuals and society.

Do I believe it’s reasonable for someone to hold to ethics based on intuition, majority rule, or emotion?

In a word, yes. At least, none of these bases is necessarily unreasonable. We are all influenced by all of these whether we choose to be or not, and each of them does have something to recommend it. Do I believe it is very reasonable for someone to hold to ethics based entirely on one of these things? No. Do I believe it is more reasonable for someone to hold to ethics based on outside evidence in addition to all these things? Yes, absolutely. This is more reasonable because it accounts for a broader scope of evidence and gets closer to an objective account of ethics.

Do I believe it’s more reasonable for someone to hold to ethics based on metaphysics than based on any other set of evidence?

That would depend entirely on what the basis is for the metaphysical theory or framework to begin with. If one holds a confident belief in a particular metaphysical theory based on sound evidence and critical investigation, and this metaphysical theory in turn provides a basis for an ethical framework, it would be quite reasonable for one to believe in that ethical framework by extension. On the other hand, if someone ends up holding to an agnostic position regarding metaphysical reality based on sound evidence and critical investigation, it is more reasonable for them to look to another basis for their ethical framework. I suppose my point is just that our metaphysical theories should be assessed independently of whether they provide a basis for our ethics (although this could be a factor in analyzing their reasonableness).

What I would object to most strongly is the idea that ethics can only be reasonably based on metaphysics for the reason that this provides an objective foundation.²⁸This, as I take it, is one of the things you argue in “Skepticism and Ethics,” “Metaphysical Skepticism and Ethical Skepticism.” I understand that without a transcendent or metaphysical principle to point to, we are forced to admit our ethics are somewhat subjective. However, as discussed previously, all our knowledge about the world is limited and imperfect – in other words, somewhat subjective. That is just who we are. To wish to escape or transcend that is perhaps natural, but it is not necessarily the most intellectually responsible thing to do, or the most reasonable.²⁹To clarify my position a bit, I would say the idea that a metaphysical belief provides an objective foundation for ethics is true in a sense, but as I’ve been trying to argue here, ultimately, none of our beliefs or their foundations are truly objective. This is because we ourselves are subjective in our perspectives and depth of knowledge about the world. We can subjectively believe in something that is theoretically objective (e.g. God or Plato’s “Form of the Good”), but we can’t claim to have objective knowledge (i.e. 100% certainty) that something really exists as we believe it does. Therefore, I don’t buy the notion that ethical frameworks based on metaphysical beliefs are categorically superior to those based on any other type of belief.

Finally, I must address the issue you’ve raised concerning my series “Beyond Love and Hate.” You suggest that I’m being inconsistent by advocating a subjective approach to ethics in the present series while arguing against such an approach in that earlier series. In response to this, I would point out, as I mentioned above, that there is a difference between holding a personal belief about something and forming an argument about something. The series “Beyond Love and Hate” is primarily about forming arguments about ethics that will be convincing to others. This requires a set of skills and considerations that aren’t always immediately relevant to someone forming their own personal beliefs. For example, while it may be relatively reasonable for someone to hold to a set of beliefs themselves that are based to a large extent on personal subjective experience, to convince others to hold these beliefs would require some additional reasoning and argument.

In any case, however, my point in that series was not to suggest that it would be possible for one to develop a perfectly logical or foolproof argument they could use to convince absolutely anybody of their ethical principles. Rather, as in this series, I’ve always recognized we are limited in our experiences and understanding of reality. Whether we’re basing our beliefs on metaphysics, physics, or anything else, to convince others to adopt our beliefs requires that we are able to articulate the reasons underlying our beliefs and that those reasons are able to be understood and shared by those we want to convince. A crucial step in this process is self-awareness and criticism, which should lead us to recognize the limits of our perspective.³⁰In the end, in a disagreement with someone else, it may well be the case that neither side convinces the other to change their mind. This does not mean that dialogue is fruitless. Part of what I wanted to show in that series was that people can think quite differently from us and still be reasonable, intelligent, sincere, and well-intentioned.

Ethical Skepticism

So, it may be reasonable to adopt a set of ethical principles while remaining skeptical about a great many important questions, including metaphysical questions, but is it good to do so? Doesn’t it lead to a lack of ethical conviction and an allowance of evil.

I would admit that in some cases, it can and it does. However, in thinking about the kind of skepticism I’m interested in embodying, the kind modeled and advocated by Socrates and Confucius, it seems to me it’s actually quite likely that this would lead to greater conviction at least regarding certain ethical issues.

Let’s consider first the Holocaust.

If I’m understanding correctly, your argument is that there were millions who did nothing to stop Hitler’s atrocities (i.e. the Holocaust), that this is likely due to a lack of conviction in those people who could have stopped these things but didn’t, and that this lack of conviction is best explained by such people being implicitly agnostic, professing belief in a religious tradition (e.g. Christianity) but not really believing it deep down or following its tenets.³¹“Skepticism and Ethics,” “Skeptical Withdrawal and Evil,” paragraph 2.

Perhaps this accounts for the apparent complacence of many people living under German rule during the period of the Holocaust, but I think it would be a mistake for us to view this alone as a very good or complete explanation for the actions of most people in that situation or for how that event came to happen as it did. I have a couple reasons for this.

First, while wars are often started and organized by politicians, they are fought by soldiers. To build, staff, and run the internment camps involved in the Holocaust required the active participation of many thousands of soldiers and other staff. The people actually doing the killing presumably had a level of commitment quite a bit beyond mere passive acceptance or complacence. My guess is that to do this sort of thing required a good amount of buy-in, belief in the cause of the Nazi Party or the nation, or at least in the goodness of faithfully following orders. But, how could so many people believe such things and act on them? This leads to my second reason for questioning the implicit agnosticism theory.

Despite how people prefer sometimes to think of it today, the ideology advanced by the Nazi party in the 1930s and 40s was not just some sort of insane fringe theory developed by one man that fell into favor at the right time. Social Darwinist ideas and eugenics programs had been previously, and were then, alive and well in many places, including the United States. At the time, many of these ideas were based on what was considered sound scientific theory regarding evolutionary biology. The idea of a superior Aryan race, too, was based on archaeological and philological evidence about real prehistoric people groups. The particular mix of these ideas and the politicization of them into a national cause was of course peculiar to the Nazis, but many of the ideas were out there already. Many intellectuals believed in them for what they understood to be good reasons, and once the extensive propaganda campaigns were underway, so too did many members of the public.

My point, which I imagine is becoming clear, is that we have good historical basis to attribute many of the events of the Holocaust to the active, willing participation of believers in the Nazi cause. For this reason, I would argue that if we want to choose, we actually may have more reason to lay blame for the Holocaust on belief than on skepticism.

This is especially true if we consider the kind of skepticism embodied and advocated by Socrates, the kind in which – as we saw in Euthyphro – authority is questioned in the name of caution and intellectual humility, especially regarding high-stakes questions, such as whether all Jews are genetically and culturally inferior and therefore worthy of systematic annihilation. I can’t help but think that if Germany had been full of skeptics of the Socratic flavor, the Holocaust may never have happened.³²The same goes for Confucius. I have trouble thinking that the Nazi political and social agenda would mesh very well with the Confucian emphasis on humility, social harmony, and reciprocal relationships between ruler and ruled, but crazier things have happened historically.

Let us turn next to the modern humanitarian crisis.

I’m less familiar with the history behind this one, and it may well be that you’ve got a better case to be made here for a lack of conviction being a major cause of the suffering of many impoverished people around the world. But, my argument would basically be the same. For as much as we could point to a widespread lack of belief in ethical responsibility toward our fellow humans, there are also firm beliefs we could point to that have either contributed to the impoverishment of people in the first place or that maintain the status quo and/or the systems perpetuating that inequality. I’m thinking here of things like nationalism, which leads people to believe their nation and its interests should be more important to them than others, or capitalist ethics, which lead people to believe their ownership of personal property is good and just and that the systems that create and perpetuate inequality of ownership and access to resources is good and just as well, or is at least a necessary evil.

When I think about it, if the question is whether the global humanitarian crisis is worse off due to tendencies toward skepticism or tendencies toward belief among people throughout the world, I don’t know the answer. Part of how we answer this question and the question of the Holocaust depends on how we tend to place blame on such huge, complex situations. I think there’s plenty of blame to go around, and I don’t think there’s an easy or simple answer to the question of who is most to blame, which I guess was one of my points in first drawing this issue into question.

When it comes down to it, I’m sure there may be negative consequences to tending too far toward skepticism – just as I’m sure there may be negative consequences to tending too far toward trust – and maybe the important thing to consider is what sort of skeptic or believer we want to be. It’s probably the case that we would want to temper our skepticism with a healthy sense of responsibility toward the rest of the world and a motivation to act even when uncertain. Part of my goal in this post has been to show that these things are not just possible, but have already been modeled for us by great thinkers and are established in ancient traditions. When I think of skepticism, this is what I have in mind, and this is what I strive to practice. Hopefully I’ve been able to convince you just a bit more of some of the merits of such a position.

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